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STUDENT NOTES
110 Ky. 680, 62 S. W. 496 (1901); Owensboro v. York, 117 Ky. 294, 77
S. W. 1130 (1904); Davis, Admr. v. Ohio Valley Banking Co., 127 Ky.
800, 106 S. W. 843 (1908); Collett's Guardian v. Standard Oil Co., 186
Ky. 142, 216 S. W. 356 (1919); Ham v. Hoard, 189 Ky. 317, 224 S. W.
868 (1920).
It is to be appreciated that a jury must indeed find itself in a
predicament in applying the subjective test in order to reach a decision after having heard all the evidence. The reason is obvious.
Under the foregoing test as it is stated an infant is required to use
only that degree of care which would ordinarily be used by a child
of its age, capacity and experience under similar circumstances. This
indefinite test places the burden on the jury to determine whether it
acted as such. Query, assuming the facts of the case to be clear, how
is a jury with nothing definite on which to work (unless one would
say that the psychological aspect of an Infant toward a certain set
of facts is definite) to go about determining whether or not a particular infant acted as an ordinary child of its age, capacity and experience would have acted under similar circumstances?
WHLIAM S. JETT, JR.

CRIMEs--TnE RIGHT OF AN OFFICER TO ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT.

In a recent Texas case the court held that an arrest by an officer
without a warrant was illegal where the evidence did not show that
the defendant was about to escape or would escape if time were taken
to secure a warrant, even though the officer had reasonable grounds to
believe the defendant was guilty of the felony committed
A brief
statement of the facts will show that the arrest would have been legal
had not the Texas statute, which governed this case, included the
clause, "it must appear that the accused was about to escape." The
deceased was found dead at his filling station about six o'clock A. M.
with a shotgun wound in his body. The defendant had been seen at
the filling station carrying a shotgun late that same afternoon. Fresh
tracks in the snow led from the filling station to the defendant's home
where he was arrested less than an hour after the killing. According
to the arresting officer's testimony, he told the defendant that he was
making an investigation and thought that he (the defendant) might
be able to give him some information. When asked if he had heard
any shots the defendant answered in the negative and, after hesitating
a moment, said, "That old man was a kind old man; I was down there'
at two o'clock but haven't been back since." The defendant apparently
made these statements without being advised of the killing. The
officer Immediately arrested the defendant without a warrant as he
was then seven miles from the county seat, the only place where he
could have secured a warrant.
1

Rippy v. State (Texas), 53 S. W. (2nd) 619 (1931).
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Various situations arise in which an officer in the pursuance of
his duty may arrest a person without a warrant and the arrest will
be legal.
L. F LO mS:
(a)
An officer may arrest a person who is in the act of committing a felony, upon view, or when he is apprised by any of his senses
that such is being committed in his presence?
(b) At common law and by statutes in almost all states an officer
may arrest a person for a felony which was committed or attempted
in his presence.3 Furthermore, an officer is justified and should arrest
on a reasonable charge by another (though the informer is not an
officer) that a felony has been committed, and that the person to be
arrested committed it. It has been said that it is not only a right but
it is the officer's duty to arrest under such circumstances, and if he
refuses to do so he is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c) If a felony has in fact been committed by some one, an
officer may arrest a suspect, if he has reasonable grounds to believe
him guilty. It is not necessary that the officer is certain that the party
to be arrested is guilty3 The officer is justified in making the arrest
although it turns out that the person arrested did not commit the
crime.!
(d) The rule with which we are most concerned is the one which
grants an officer the right to arrest without a warrant on suspicion of
a felony in case he has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony
has been committed and the person to be arrested committed it. The
American Law Institute suggests this rule in their model Code of
Criminal Procedure7 There are many state and federal decisions
which decide this rule to be law in those particular jurisdictions.
Though an officer may arrest without a warrant if he has reasonable grounds or cause to suspect that a felony has been committed,
he may not do so "arbitiarily, and it is indispensable to justify the
arrest of one actually innocent that the circumstances were such that
an ordinary person would have believed the party to be guilty; 8 so an
officer may not effect a legal arrest on mere suspicion 9 However, it
is not necessary that the officer absolutely know that a felony has
2

Partinv. Cor., 197 Ky. 840, 248 S. W. 489 (1923); Collins v. Com.,
192 Ky. 412, 233 S. W. 896 (1921).
3 ClarkCs Criminal Pro., 2nd Ed., p. 45.
"Cowles v. Dunbar, 2 Car. & P. 565, 172 Eng. Rep. 257- (1827).
5 Com. v. Carey, 12 Cush. 246 (1853).
6 Com. v. Cheney, 141 Mass. 102, 6 N. E. 724 (1886).
'Pritchett, et al. v. Sulivan, 182 Fed. 480 (1910); Castle v. Lewis,
254 Fed. 917 (1918); Brown v. U. S., 4 Fed. (2nd) 246 (1925); U. S. v.
Rembert, 284 Fed. 996 (1922); Dilger v. Com., 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. 651
(1889); Wright v. Corn., 85 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. 904 (1887); Graw v. Forge,
183 Ky, 551, 209 S. W. 369 (1919); Klatz v. Cook, 184 Ky. 735, 212
S. W. 917 (1919); Com. v. Riley, 192 Ky. 153, 232 S. W. 630 (1921).
8 Cqstle v. Lewis, supra, note 7.
*Brown v. U. S., supra, note 7.

STUDENT NoTEs
been committed, but he may govern himself by the credible evidence
given by others.0 Carroll's Kentucky Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an officer may arrest when "he has reasonable grounds to
believe that a felony has been committed."" However, the facts must
be such that a resonably prudent man would believe that the person
to be arrested had committed the felony." Reasonable grounds have
been said to require both reasonable belief and probable grounds so
well founded as would actuate a reasonable man acting in good faith
to that belief," or such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person about to be arrested is guilty of the offense
charged.
There are a few states which have, by statute, limited the prevailing rule. For instance, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides, "Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer,
upon representation by a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no
time to procure a warrant, such a peace officer may arrest without
a warrant."" This rule is contrary to the great weight of authority.
I[I.

MISDEMEANOICS:

(a)
An officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person to prevent him from committing a midemeanor which tends to be a breach
of the peace."
(b) An officer may arrest a -person who is at the time committing a misdemeanor in his presence which amounts to a breach of
the peace, and if given statutory authority he may arrest for those
misdemeanors not amounting to a breach of the peace.8
In the case, Myers v. State," the court held that an automobile
standing in the street without a license tag did not sufficiently show
that a misdemeanor was being committed, so that the arrest of the
owner, without a warrant, could be legally made. The question raised
In this case is whether the arrest is made on suspicion or probable
cause. The difficulty in laying down the rule consists in determining
"probable cause," and the court attempts to give a test for it. "One
of the safest tests, although we do not declare it to be under all circumstances an exclusive test of when a misdemeanor is committed in
the presence of an officer, is whether the officer as a witness could
at the time of the arrest of his own knowledge testify to sufficient
facts as having happened in his presence to make out a case for conviction if his evidence is undisputed; and of course an admission made
OU. S. v. Rembert, supra, note 7.
Carroll, Kentucky Code of Criminal Pro., Sec. 36.
Graw v. Forge, supra, note 7.
Crom. v. Riley, supra, note 7.
1"Texas Code of Criminal Pro., 1925, Art. 215.
"State v. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 551 (1881).
IODilger v. Com., 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. 651 (1889).
"Myers v. State, 158 Miss. 554, 130 So. 741 (1930).
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to him or in his presence is sufficient to supply knowledge of those
facts competent to be covered by admissions."
(c)
Assuming that an officer has statutory authority to arrest
for misdemeanors committed in his presence other than those which
amount to a breach of the peace, the arrest must be made immediately
or upon immediate and continuous pursuit. 8
A crime is committed in an officer's presence if he is apprised of
its commission by his sense of sight,"8 or hearing, or smell.
A
Federal court in the case of McBride v. U. S., held that federal agents,
who, having entered upon the premises where there was an unoccupied
house, smelled fumes from a still, were authorized to arrest without
a warrant after they had found a still in illegal operation.
Another
federal case held that when an officer is apprised by any of his senses
that a crime is being committeed it is committed in his presence. If
the officer is able to detect it as the act of the accused it is in his presence.? However, merely beng in sight and hearing, without the power
to detect or identify the accused, or what he is doing is not sufficient.?"
Yet hearing has been held to be sufficient as where, in th6 night, an
officer heard screams coming from an upstairs room, where he found
a man beating a woman.?
(d) According to the common law rule an officer could not arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor other than those amounting to
a breach of the peace, except in a few cases such as "night walking"
and "riding armed," for which authority to arrest without a warrant
had been given by statutes so ancient that the statutory origin of
the privilege had been forgotten and the privilege was regarded as
substantially one existing at common law.JOHN A. EvANs.

TRUSTs-TRusTs CREATED BY PaECATORY WoRDs.
The testator made a will that was duly executed and contained
the following provision: "I will, bequeath, and devise to my beloved
wife Mary A. Williams, all of my property, real and personal, to be
hers absolutely. It is my desire and I request that if I pre-decease
her, then before her death, she will make a will giving to her pebple
one-half (/2) of my property, and to my people the other one-half
'822 Mich. L. Rev. 683; State v. Lewis, 50 Ohio St. 179, 33. N. E.
405 (1893).
SmBruck v. People, 72 Col. 97, 209 Pac. 636 (1922).
State v. Bla kwelder, 182 N. C. 899, 109 S. E. 644 (1921); Dilger
v. Cor., 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. 651.
21 U. S. v. Barlcowslki, 268 Fed. 408 (1920).
"McBride v. U. S., 284 Fed. 416 (1922).
Vaught v. U. S., 7 Fed. (2d) 370 (1925).
'"Reed v. Cor., 125 Ky. 126, 100 S. W. 586 (1907).
Z Hughes v. Cor., 19 Ky. L. Rep. 497, 41 S. W. 294 (1897).
ODiZger v. Cor., 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. 651 (1889).
'175 University of Pa. L. Rev. 485.

